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We derive the optimal portfolio choice and consumption pattern over the lifecycle for 
households facing labor income, capital market, and mortality risk. In addition to stocks and 
bonds, households also have access to deferred annuities. Deferred annuities offer a hedge 
against mortality risk and provide similar benefits as Social Security. We show that a 
considerable fraction of wealth should be annuitized to skim the return enhancing mortality 
credit. The remaining liquid wealth (stocks and bonds) is used to hedge labor income risk during 
work life and to earn the equity premium. We find a marginal difference between a strategy 
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With the decline of traditional dened benet pension plans, dened contribution plans
gained considerable importance for companies around the world in the past two decades.
Dened contribution plans and private saving plans are typically self-managed by house-
holds. Arguably, Social Security is said to experience major cuts in the scheduled benet
payments to guarantee the solvency of the traditional PAYGO system in aging societies.
The literature argues with a dominance criterion for purchasing annuities to nance
consumption (e.g. Yaari 1965 ). Despite this theoretical dominance argument voluntary
annuitization is still limited around the world. There are many advocates of embedding
annuitization as a default mechanism in order to re-enforce withdrawal discipline in tax
sheltered pension accounts that is naturally found in annuity payments, Social Security
and dened benet schedules. Many times the preferred instrument to implement the
payout and savings discipline is the deferred annuity.
Similar to an immediate annuity, a deferred annuity promises life long payouts in
exchange for an initial non-refundable premium paid to the insurance provider. Con-
trary to immediate annuities, the contract of a deferred annuity stipulates that the
annuity does not provide any payments until a certain number of years u passed. If the
annuitant perishes during the deferring period, the premium is lost for the annuitant's
heirs. In fact, a deferred annuity is much cheaper compared to an immediate annuity
with identical payouts because the benets are deferred until t + u, where t is the age
when the annuities are bought.
While immediate life annuities were recently studied to a large extent by Blake,
Cairns, and Dowd (2003), Horne, Maurer, and Stamos (2008a,b), Horne, Maurer,
Mitchell, and Dus (2008), Kingston and Thorp (2005), Koijen, Nijman, and Werker
(2006), Milevsky and Young (2007), Milevsky, Moore, and Young (2006), Yogo (2008),
deferred annuities have not been considered in the dynamic asset allocation of private
1households so far.
Scott, Watson, and Hu (2008) recommend purchasing deferred annuities in case the
extent to which annuities can be bought is limited. A key assumption of their analysis
constitutes that the initial retirement budget is entirely spent on bonds and so called
'zero coupon annuities', i.e. contracts with a single payo in a given year conditional on
the annuitant's survival. Payos of both products are entirely consumed in each period.
Milevsky (2005) analyzes the design as well as the pricing features of real (i.e. where
benets are adjusted for in
ation) deferred annuities. Additionally, he argues that such
products can overcome psychological factors frequently mentioned for explaining the
empirically low levels of voluntary annuitization (also known as the annuity puzzle).
Especially, he pointed out that "engaging in irreversible nancial transactions - that is
annuitization - involving large lump sums will never be appealing to individuals regard-
less of (whether they grasp) the importance of longevity insurance". The alternative
would be to buy deferred annuities which are much cheaper than immediate annuities
regardless how important longevity insurance perceived is. This is the alternative which
is seemingly much cheaper than immediate annuities - over a long period of time. We
argue that the household can construct a deferred annuity by rolling over payouts from
immediate annuities (cf. to appendix A). We show that such a roll-over strategy pro-
vides the same benets for the identical initial outlay as a deferred annuity. This is
true whenever the discount factor and the mortality rates to price the annuity are cer-
tain. Yet, the household can use the annuity for dierent purposes than rolling them
over into new immediate annuities. Insofar the annuity with immediate payouts gives
the household greater 
exibility to react to adverse developments in the labor income
or in the capital markets, particularly if borrowing on human capital and illiquid life
contingent assets is restricted. Therefore, it would be interesting to study the behavior
as well as the utility loss if the household has only access to deferred life annuities.
2Albeit, the lack of attention for deferred annuities in the literature, they appear to
be ubiquitous. Intriguingly, the payment structure of deferred annuities is also hidden
within Social Security. Typically employees repeatedly contribute a mandatory frac-
tion of their current labor income to Social Security during their working life. In turn,
contributions are used to fund the payments for beneciaries currently in retirement.
Beneciaries receive a certain amount determined by their average past contributions
and working years for as long as they are alive. In fact, Social Security can be consid-
ered as an instrument of purchasing deferred annuities repeatedly during working life
because the benet 
ow of Social Security closely resembles the payout structure of a
deferred annuity. The same is true for dened benet plans in which employers make
contributions to fund the pension plan. Later in retirement, the household receives the
payments from the dened pension benet plan for as long as the head of the household
stays alive.
Social Security and dened benet plans have a deferral period reaching up to the
beginning of retirement. Therefore, we augment the strategic asset allocation by de-
ferred annuities where payments also start at the beginning of the retirement period
in order to compare the interaction among Social Security, dened benet plans, and
deferred annuities. Apart from the consumption strategy, we also derive the optimal
equity-bond-annuity portfolio for a CRRA utility maximizing household facing un-
spanned labor income. In order to better understand the deferral strategy, we augment
the portfolio by immediate annuities as done in Horne, Maurer, and Stamos (2008).
Then we analyze how closely the underlying annuitization strategy including immediate
annuities resembles a deferral strategy. Both annuitization strategies are compared in
depth to highlight the similarities and dierences between them.
In the rst section, we discuss the model we apply to nd the optimal deferred
annuity demand over life. Here, we discuss preferences, labor income, annuity as well as
3capital market specications, wealth accumulation, and our numerical analysis. In the
following chapter, we conduct a Monte Carlo analysis, in order to analyze the expected
life cycle prole as well as the expected asset allocation. We try to identify the dierence
between an annuitization strategy when only deferred annuities are involved before
retirement and a strategy with immediate annuities only. A nal chapter concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 Preferences
In our study, we employ a time discrete model with t 2 f0;:::;T + 1g, where t consti-
tutes the investor's adult age. The adult age is the actual age less 19. We denote ps
t
as the investor's subjective probability to survive from t until t + 1. Furthermore, we
assume that the investor's preferences are given by the CRRA utility function dened
over a single non-durable consumption good. Let Ct be the consumption level at time









where  is the level of relative risk aversion and  is the personal discount factor. Here we
assume that the household does not derive any utility from bequeathing potential heirs.1
Today's utility is given as the utility from consumption and tomorrow's discounted
utility from future consumption. We have ps
T = 0 (1) for the nal period. In T







1This can be justied that the household put only that part of nancial wealth into the annuity
which is not intended for a bequest, i.e. we only consider that part of wealth which is required for
consumption purchases. Also see Stamos (2008) on this point.
4which gives us the terminal condition for VT. From the nal value, we can work back-
wards to nd the optimal strategies how to consume, invest in bonds, stocks, and how
to purchase deferred annuities.
2.2 Labor Income Process
In order to understand how the illiquidity of deferred annuities aects the overall asset
allocation, we model transitory and permanent income shocks. Previous literature on
strategic asset allocation such as Bodie, Merton, and Samuelson (1992), Cocco, Gomes
and Maenhout (2005), Heaton and Lucas (1997), and Viceira (2001) highlighted the
relevance of considering unspanned labor income when analyzing the strategic asset
allocation decisions of households. The labor income Yt is given by:
Yt = exp(f(t))PtUt; (3)
Pt = Pt 1Nt; (4)
where f(t) is used to recover the hump shape of the empirically observed income prole
over time t. Here, Pt is a permanent component with innovation Nt. Ut is a transitory
shock. The logarithms of both Nt and Ut are normally distributed with means zero and
with volatilities N, U, respectively. The shocks are assumed to be uncorrelated. In
retirement (t  K), we assume for the sake of simplicity that the individual receives
constant pension payments Yt =  exp(f(K))PK, where  is the constant replacement
ratio.
2.3 Annuity and Capital Markets
The household can directly invest in two nancial assets: riskless bonds and risky stocks.
The real bond gross return is given by Rf, while the real risky stock return in t is Rt.
5The risky return is log-normally distributed with an expected return  and volatility
s. Let n(u) denote the correlation between the stock returns and the permanent
(transitory) income shocks.
In our model, the household can also purchase deferred constant real payout life
annuities before retirement and immediate annuities with constant payouts during the
retirement period. In our analysis, a life annuity is a nancial contract between an
individual and an insurer "that pays out a periodic amount for as long as the annuitant
is alive, in exchange for an initial premium" (Brown et al., 2001). During the working
life, the life annuity does not pay out until the investor reaches the retirement age K,
even though the premium is possibly exchanged years before the end of the investor's
working life.
The illiquidity related to deferred annuities adversely aects the investor's ability
to react to either adverse developments of labor income or sudden declines in the stock
market. In return for the illiquidity, the household gains a spread over the typical bond
investment. The spread comes about because the funds of those who die in the annuity
pool are distributed among the living members of a cohort. The literature refers to
this attribute of annuities as the mortality credit. Therefore, a deferred annuity simply
constitutes a separate asset class with distinctive risk and return characteristics. We
treat the purchase of deferred annuities as a portfolio choice problem by putting them
on an equal footing with equity and bond investments. In the remainder, we model
the annuitization decision essentially in a dynamic portfolio choice framework akin to
Horne, Maurer, and Stamos (2008).
The actuarial premium At of a deferred life annuity with payments L starting in K is
dierent from the life annuity payments within the retirement period. During working
life, the household can only purchase deferred annuities where payments commence
only at retirement. In retirement, the household can buy immediate annuities, where
6payments start from the next period onwards. Lt denotes the payouts from immediate
annuities because we allow the household to also purchase immediate life annuities in





LK ht; t < K;
Lt ht; t  K
(5)
where ht is the annuity factor for an individual with adult age t. The annuity factor
during the working life is essentially the pricing equation for deferred annuities with
payments starting at the beginning of the retirement period.






















f t < K (6)
where pa
u are the survival probabilities used by the life annuity provider and  is the
loading factor. In turn, the annuity factor is the loading factor times the deferral
discount factor times the sum of the discounted expected payouts. In retirement, the
household can also purchase immediate annuities. The annuity factor reduces to:












f ; t  K (7)
In general, insurers use survival probabilities pa
u that are higher than the average
population survival probabilities ps
u. The additional price increment is thought of as a
compensation for both the adverse selection going on in annuity markets (Brugiavini,
1993, Finkelstein and Poterba, 2004) and the macro longevity risk (Cairns, Blake, and
Dowd, 2006b). Adverse selection in annuity markets arises because heads of households
who believe themselves to be healthier than average are more likely to buy annuities.
Macro longevity risk refers to the risk of changing mortality probabilities. Administra-
7tion costs to organize the pool are covered by the loading factor . We assume zero
loads and no asymmetries in mortality beliefs except for the welfare analysis where we
introduce a loading factor.
We only consider highly incomplete annuity markets inasmuch only deferred annu-
ities with life long payouts are available during working life and funds underlying the
annuity are totally invested in bonds. We do not account for annuities which payout
at only one specic age and state (as in the complete markets case in Davido, Brown,
and Diamond, 2005). Due to adverse selection issues and market incompleteness such
Arrow Debreu annuities do not exist. (see Yagi and Nishigaki (1993))
2.4 Wealth Accumulation
At the beginning of every period, the utility maximizing household under consideration
can decide on how to spread wealth on hand Wt across bonds Mt, stocks St, new
annuities purchases At, and consumption Ct. Therefore, the budget constraint is
Wt = Mt + St + At + Ct; (8)
where we refer to Mt + St as the value of nancial wealth. The individual's disposable





MtRf + StRt+1 + Yt+1 t < K
MtRf + StRt+1 + Lt+1 + Yt+1 t  K;
(9)
where MtRf +StRt+1 denotes the next period value of nancial wealth, Lt+1 is the sum
of annuity income which the investor gets from all previously purchased annuities and
Yt+1 is the labor income. The state variable LK records the claims of accessing annuity
payouts at adult age K inasmuch deferred payments start at this age. Whereas the
8state variable Lt after age K denotes the sum of payouts from previously purchased
immediate and deferred annuities. Note that the sum of claims to annuity payouts and





K + At=ht t < K
Lt+1 = Lt + At=ht t  K
(10)
where LK is the sum of all annuity payments from annuities purchased before K and
At=ht is the annuity payment purchased in t. In t + 1 the investor has to make a new
decision on how to spread wealth on hand Wt+1 across bonds, stocks, annuities, and
consumption. We prevent households from borrowing against human capital and from
selling annuities. Both restrictions are binding because otherwise households would
engage in highly leveraged stock positions nanced by short positions in bonds and/or
annuities in order to compensate the over-investment in human capital at young ages.
Thus each year the optimal policy has to satisfy:
Mt;St;At  0: (11)
2.5 Numerical Method and Calibration
Optimization problems of this type cannot be solved analytically due to the untradeable
labor income, the irreversibility of annuity purchases, and the shortselling restrictions.
Therefore we adopt the standard approach of dynamic stochastic programming to solve
the household's optimization problem. The household maximizes (1) under budget and
short-selling restrictions (8),(9), and (11), whereby the choice variables in each year the
household is alive are the demand for stocks St, bonds Mt, new life annuities At, and
consumption Ct. The optimal policy depends on four state variables: the permanent
income level Pt, wealth on hand Wt, annuity payouts from previously purchased an-
9nuities Lt, and age t. First of all, the curse of dimensionality (Bellman, 1961) can be
partly mitigated by reducing the state space by one state variable as we exploit the scale
independence of the optimal policy if we rewrite all variables using lower-case letters
as ratios of the permanent income component Pt (see for example Cocco, Gomes, and
Maenhout, 2005). We solve the problem in a three-dimensional state space by backward
induction. The continuous state variables normalized wealth w and normalized annuity
payouts l have to be discretized and the only discrete state variable is age t. The size
of the grid is 40(w)x40(l)x81(t). The grid we use is equally spaced for the logarithms
of w and l since the policy functions and value function are especially sensitive in the
area with low w or l. For each grid point we calculate the optimal policy and the size
of the value function.
To provide numerical insight into our setup, we calibrate the stylized case as follows:
The starting age is set to 20, the retirement age to 65 (K = 46), and the maximum
age to 100 (T = 81). In addition, we also study the case when annuity payouts start
only at age 85. The preference parameters are set to standard values found in the life-
cycle literature (e.g. Gomes and Michaelides, 2005): coecient of relative risk aversion
 = 5 and the personal discount factor  = 0:96. Applying nonlinear least squares
we t the Gompertz force of mortality to the 2000 Population Basic mortality table
for US females. We use them for pricing the annuities and for evaluating the utility
from consumption. The deterministic age-dependent labor income function f(t) for
individuals with high school education excluding college education and the replacement
ratio  = 0:68 are taken from Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout (2005). Our volatility
parameters u = 0:15 and n = 0:1 are in line with the estimates found by Gourinchas
and Parker (2002). Furthermore, we select a real interest rate Rf of 2 percent, an
equity premium  Rf of 4 percent, and a stock volatility  of 18 percent. We choose
correlations between the stock returns and the transitory (permanent) income shocks
10of n = 0 (u = 0).
3 Optimal Annuity Demand
3.1 Deferred Life Annuities
In this section, we analyze the simulated distributions of the relevant choice and state
variables by conducting an extensive Monte Carlo analysis based on the optimal feed-
back controls we obtained from solving the Bellman equation under the shortselling
restrictions (see appendix B) Drawing 50,000 independent stochastic scenarios, we rst
compute the expected life cycle prole for our stylized case with risky labor income as
the inclined reader can infer from gure (1). Graph A shows that the household starts
purchasing deferred annuities from age 38 on in expectation and continues until the
retirement before turning to immediate annuities in our analysis. If deferred annuities
are purchased as early as 38, the household is willing to wait at least 27 years before
the annuity starts paying o. After entering retirement, the household further buys
immediate life annuities. The liquid savings of the household peak at 55 when savings
are 5.5 times the average labor income. When the household turns 77, all liquid sav-
ings are exhausted. After the age 77, the household uses both the current pension and
annuity income to bet on survival by purchasing more immediate annuities. Expected
consumption increases because the household is not able to borrow against both the
annuity and future pension income. Turning to the expected asset allocation, we nd
the typical life cycle prole as the overall equity exposure is successively reduced in
favor of deferred annuities. Initially, the equity exposure is high to counterbalance the
implicit holdings in human capital. Over time the value of human capital shrinks and
the mortality credit of deferred annuities surges. In turn, annuities crowd out the eq-
uity exposure of the household. Bonds only play a miniscule role in the asset allocation



























































Figure 1: Expected Life Cycle and Asset Allocation: Graph (A) shows the expected
Life Cycle prole in terms of consumption, new annuity purchases, liquid savings, sum
of annuity payouts, and labor as well as retirement income. Graph (B) depicts the
expected asset allocation of the household over the life-cycle. In our analysis, we assume
a female with maximum life-span age 20 - 100, no loads for annuities, no mortality
asymmetries,  = 5, income is stochastic. We calculate the expectations by resorting
to 50,000 Monte-Carlo simulations using the optimal policies derived by solving the
Bellman equation. When computing the expected portfolio weights we determine the
value of annuity wealth as the actuarial present value of payouts from all previously
purchased annuities.
because they are dominated by the mortality-credit enhanced deferred annuities early
on. The only reason for the household to have some bond exposure is to rebalance the
portfolio quickly after a sharp drop within the investment portfolio.
3.2 Roll-over Features of Immediate Life Annuities
In this section, we analyze to what extent immediate annuity purchases resemble a
deferring strategy over the life cycle. To do so, we have to modify two transition
equations to account for immediate payout annuities during working life. The state
variables develop as follows:
Lt+1 = Lt + At=ht (12)
12where the annuity factor is simply computed as:













The annuity factor is the expected sum of discounted annuity payouts. We also
have to make sure that the household receives immediate payouts in the next period,
therefore we have to change the cash on hand during the working life period.
Wt+1 = MtRf + StRt+1 + Lt+1 + Yt+1 (14)
In order to analyze how frequently a deferred annuity is constructed or partly
resembled through the ongoing purchase of immediate life annuities, we rst derive
the optimal feedback controls for purchasing immediate annuities over the life cycle.
After obtaining the new annuity dynamics, we conduct a Monte Carlo analysis with
50,000 iterations. Now we consider on each of the life cycle paths how many times
a household rolls the annuity payout over into a new annuity purchase. To do so,
we compute the payouts Lt from previously purchased annuities and compare them
to the amount of new annuity purchases At. Whenever Lt < At we know that all
payouts are rolled over to a new annuity in that given year. Using this specication, we
compute for each household the maximum number of successive roll-over years. Figure
(2) provides the distribution of the maximum roll-over years. Hereby, graph (A) reports
the result for the case when labor income is certain. The average time of a continued
roll-over strategy is 7.6 years while the most frequent maximum roll-over is seven years.
Therefore, a typical household with certain labor income buys immediate annuities for
seven successive years by spending at least as much cash on hand as available from
annuity payouts.
As graph (B) in gure (2) shows: if the household faces uninsurable stochastic labor










Graph (A) Certain Labor Income
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Graph (B) Risky Labor Income
















Figure 2: Maximum Years of Roll-Over: Graph (A) shows the case with certain labor
income. Graph (B) depicts the case with risky labor income. Maximum years of
roll-over means the number of successive years in which the payouts from annuities
cannot fully cover the new annuity purchases. In our analysis, we assume a female
with maximum life-span age 20 - 100, no loads for annuities, no mortality asymmetries,
 = 5. We calculate 50.000 dierent life-cycles by using the optimal policies derived by
the maximization of the Bellman equation under constraints.
income, the distribution is moved to the left hand side (mean 5.8) and shows a much
higher variability (2.0). This can be explained by the fact that the household requires
more 
exibility to use the payouts from annuities in a dierent way.
While the previous analysis considered all life-cycles pathwise, the following break-
down looks at percentage of a roll-over strategy per year across all households. Again,
we consider the simulated paths based on the optimal strategy with immediate an-
nuities. Contrary to the previous analysis, we compare the probability of rolling the
annuity payouts over into new life annuity purchases in a cross section analysis by con-
sidering all households at a certain point in time. The results are displayed in gure
(3). As one can infer from graph (A), the roll-over strategy is done in most cases early
on. However, only few households voluntarily annuitize at this stage of their life cycle,
especially if labor income is certain. So the percentage term might not be as representa-
tive as other gures in our analysis. Here, the percentage of roll-over strategies seldom
drops below 50 percent before retirement starts. In the case of risky labor income, the
























































Figure 3: Percentage of Roll-Over: Graph (A) shows the case with certain labor income.
Graph (B) depicts the case with risky labor income. In our analysis, we assume a female
with maximum life-span age 20 - 100, no loads for annuities, no mortality asymmetries,
 = 5. We calculate 50.000 dierent life-cycles by using the optimal policies derived by
the maximization of the Bellman equation under constraints.
roll-over strategies are less likely since the household has to rebalance the portfolio and
buer adverse career developments.
3.3 Deferred vs. Immediate Life Annuities
In this section, we compare the purchasing behavior of households as far as deferred
and immediate life annuities are concerned. First, we analyze the expected new annuity
purchases over the life cycle for the case with certain labor income. The results are
reported in Graph A of gure (4). The household uses more cash on hand to purchase
immediate than deferred life annuities. The discrepancy among all three strategies
reaches its largest point at age 60. While the dierence for all annuity strategies is
moderate in case of certain labor income, the dierence becomes even more pronounced
in case the labor income is risky. Again, the greatest discrepancy between the deferring
and the annuitization strategy peaks at age 60. The following analysis considers the
welfare loss of having only access to deferred annuities as compared to immediate ones.




























































































Figure 4: Expected Spending on New Annuities: Graph (A) shows the case with certain
labor income. Graph (B) depicts the case with risky labor income. In our analysis,
we assume a female with maximum life-span age 20 - 100, no loads for annuities, no
mortality asymmetries,  = 5. We calculate 50,000 dierent life-cycles by using the
optimal policies derived by the maximization of the Bellman equation under constraints.
In our welfare analysis, we also consider cases where we include explicit loads of
 = 2:38. In addition, we assume a dierence in mortality beliefs by using an annu-
ity mortality table for pricing the life annuities. Welfare gains are computed as the
additional constant life long income (as a fraction of average labor income) an individ-
ual without access to deferred and immediate annuity markets would need in order to
attain the same expected utility as in the case with annuity markets. The numerical
computations are done for age 20. Then we compute the marginal welfare loss of having
only access to deferred annuities as compared to immediate annuities by calculating the
dierence in the additional consumption stream between the deferred and the imme-
diate annuitization strategy. The actual dierence in the additional life long income
stream is displayed in the following summarizing table.
The welfare loss of having only access to deferred annuities starting at age 65
as compared to immediate annuities is small at 1 bp dierence in the case without
any loadings. The welfare dierence for an annuity starting paying o at age 85 is
bigger with 51 bp. If we add initial loadings to our analysis, deferred annuities become
16Welfare Gains at Age 20
Deferred 65 Deferred 85
Risky Labor Income
Without Loads -1 bp -51 bp
With Loads +1 bp -18 bp
Riskless Labor Income
Without Loads > -1 bp -28 bp
With Loads +1 bp -3 bp
Table 1: This table reports welfare gains in the presence of annuity markets for all cases
considered previously. Welfare gains are computed as the additional constant life-long
income (as a fraction of average labor income) at age 20 an individual without access
to annuity markets would need in order to attain the same expected utility as in the
case with annuity markets. Then we compute the additional welfare loss of having
only access to deferred annuities as compared to immediate annuities. This is done by
computing the dierence in the additional consumption stream between the deferred
and the immediate annuitization strategy. The numerical computations are done for
deferred annuities where payouts start either at age 65 or at age 85.
preferable to a small extent in as much the household has to bear the costs of rolling
the annuity payouts over in each period. When dropping the riskiness of labor income,
the dierence to immediate annuities becomes even smaller. While in the case with
risky labor income, immediate payouts are an important cash 
ow whenever the labor
income and the stock market decline, the utility loss in the certain labor income case
is smaller due to the lack of uncertainty generated by income 
uctuations. As we have
seen in the previous section, the household rolls the payouts over more often if income
is certain.
4 Conclusion and Discussion
In this study, we derive the optimal deferred-annuity-bond-equity portfolio of a house-
hold facing unspanned labor income. We compare the resulting annuitization to the
17one with immediate annuities. We nd an astonishing similarity between the two dif-
ferent annuitization strategies. The purchasing behavior of deferred annuities is very
much in line with the one observed in the previous literature, which analyzes the an-
nuitization strategy with immediate annuities. Even though the household purchases
less deferred annuities than immediate annuities in expectation, the life cycle proles
and the expected asset allocations are virtually the same. Furthermore, we nd that
households having only access to immediate annuities engage in a roll-over strategy
mimicking deferred annuities to a considerable extent. The roll-over strategy is less
pronounced if the household faces risky labor income as compared to certain labor
income. A welfare comparison indicates a small dierence between immediate and de-
ferred annuitization, particularly for the case where annuity payouts commence at age
65. Deferred annuities might become more appealing in relative terms to immediate,
if loading is considerably high. Since deferred annuities are less capital intensive than
immediate annuities, they might be a good instrument to overcome the reluctance to
engage in irreversible nancial transactions such as annuitization early in life.
18Appendix A: Rollover vs. Deferred Strategy
We argue that a roll-over strategy using annuities with immediate payouts leads - with
identical cash 
ows - to the same payout as the purchase of a deferred annuity. Here
we consider two intervals: period 1 and period 2. The investor can decide between a
deferred annuity and a roll-over strategy using immediate annuities. Furthermore, p1
denotes the probability of surviving the rst period from time 0 to 1, while p2 is the
probability of surviving the second period from time 1 to 2. The discount rate r is
constant, the loading factor is , and the resulting price for the annuity is X. The
payout LD








In the case of an immediate annuity with payments LI
1 in period 1 and of gLI
1 in












Now the investor uses the proceeds LI
1 from the immediate annuity to purchase an an-









19The resulting sum of the payouts from the previous annuity and the current annu-
ity purchased in period 2 is LI
cum = gLI
1 + LI
















Now, we can check the condition that the cumulative payouts from the roll-over strategy









gp2+r = 1 (19)
This condition is fullled in the case of a loading factor equal to one,  = 1, i.e. if
the annuities are actuarially fairly priced. In case  > 1 the resulting payos from the
roll-over strategy is lower compared to the deferred annuity strategy.
20Appendix B: Numerical Integration and Optimal Annuitization Policy
For computing the value function, we have to solve the multiple integral. Thereby, the















t+1 + (1   ps
t)kb
1 
t+1 )'(Rt+1)dRt+1 t  K;
(20)
with '(:) denoting the (multivariate) probability density function of the log-normal
distribution is computed by resorting to gaussian quadrature integration and the op-
timization is done by numerical constrained maximization routines. The values of the
policy functions and value function lying between the grid points are computed by




































Figure 5: Annuity Policy: Graph shows annuity policy with risky labor income. Un-
til age 65 with household purchases deferred annuities with payouts starting at age
65. Later, the household purchases immediate annuities. In our analysis, we assume
a female with maximum life-span age 20 - 100, no loads for annuities, no mortality
asymmetries,  = 5, where L is set to zero.
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